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Corporate Governance Reform and Risk-Taking: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural 
Experiment in an Emerging Market 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Existing studies suggest that stricter Corporate Governance Reform (CGR) reduces corporate 
risk-taking, primarily due to higher compliance costs and expanded liabilities of insiders or 
managers. We revisit the relationship between CGR and risk-taking in an emerging market 
set-up characterized by weaker market forces of corporate scrutiny and greater insider 
ownership, which encourages firms to pursue investment conservatism. Using a quasi-natural 
experiment, we find that stricter CGR leads to greater corporate risk-taking. We further show 
that risk-taking is an important channel through which CGR enhances firm value. Our 
findings support the view that stricter CGR can have a positive effect on corporate risk-taking 
and corporate investment decisions in an evolving regulatory environment. 
 
JEL Codes: G32; G34; G38 
Keywords: corporate governance reform; risk-taking; emerging market; quasi-natural 
experiment. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies on corporate governance reform (CGR) show that it discourages corporate 
risk-taking. These findings, which are primarily based on the experience of adopting the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, suggest that CGR that expands the personal liability of 
decision-makers for non-compliance increases the compliance burden, shrinks managerial 
flexibility, and discourages managers or insiders from undertaking potentially value-
enhancing risky projects. Empirical evidence from Bargeron et al. (2010) that documents a 
reduction in the appetite for risk-taking among US firms following the introduction of SOX 
supports this view. They argue that the increased financial and criminal liability imposed by 
SOX reduces insiders’ motivation to pursue risky investments. Cohen and Dey (2013) offer a 
similar argument and note that the reduced risk-taking activities of US firms following the 
implementation of SOX is partly due to the expanded personal liability of corporate insiders.1 
There is an alternative view that predicts a positive relationship between CGR and 
risk-taking to the extent that CGR improves corporate scrutiny and the monitoring of insiders. 
John et al. (2008) show that corporate risk-taking is higher in firms operating in better 
governed environments. They argue that corporate risk-taking involves a utility trade-off for 
insiders between the wealth effect from risky investments and extraction of private benefits.2 
Better investor protection not only lowers the magnitude and importance of private benefits 
but also reduces the cost of capital, thereby creating a higher wealth effect of investments 
(Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Thus, CGR, which increases investor protection, should 
                                                 
1
 Another strand of literature contends that a negative relationship exists between excessive investor protection 
and value-relevant risk-taking, based on the argument that excessive shareholder empowerment leads to short -
term opportunism at the cost of value-relevant, long-term (risky) investments (Belloc, 2013; Honoré et al., 
2015). 
2
 Utility from private benefits are derived from the ability of controlling insiders to consume resources which 
could either be monetary, such as very high salary for the block-holding insiders, or non-monetary, such as the 
amenities that come from controlling establishments, such as professional sport clubs, newspapers, and other 
social clubs (Paligorova, 2010). 
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increase insiders’ appetite for potentially value-maximizing risky investments by shifting 
their utility toward the wealth effect of investment and away from the extraction of private 
benefits. 
These two opposing views on the effect of CGR on corporate risk-taking motivate our 
empirical study. Moreover, our study focuses on a relatively weaker investor protection 
environment in an emerging market, where, compared to its developed market counterparts, 
concentrated ownership structures accentuate the conflict of interest between controlling 
insiders and minority shareholders (Bertrand et al., 2002; Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Stulz, 
2005; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). For instance, Stulz (2005) notes that firms in countries 
with relatively weaker investor protection systems have dominant insiders with significant 
control over the resources that they use for private benefits.3 Therefore, in an environment 
with relatively weaker market-based monitoring, stricter CGR can substitute the missing 
market forces of corporate scrutiny (Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). The resulting 
substitutive effect of regulatory reform could, therefore, alter insiders’ utility trade-off to 
pursue corporate risk-taking. 
After a few years of initial groundwork, India implemented a major CGR in 2000 
with the adoption of Clause-49, introducing greater disclosure requirements, board 
independence, and transparency. However, following Dharmapala and Khanna (2013), we 
primarily focus on the 2004 amendment of the Securities Contracts Act, 1956, which 
introduced Section 23E. Section 23E expanded the personal liabilities of the management, the 
board, and the auditors, and imposed significant financial and criminal penalties for non-
compliance with the provisions listed under Clause-49. As the applicability of Clause-49 was 
                                                 
3
 Using a de facto measure of firm level corporate governance standards, Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) show 
that emerging markets’ firms score much lower than the firms in developed markets. Similarly, Stulz (2005) 
shows that the potential risks of expropriation (on a scale of 0-10 with the higher value indicating a lower risk of 
expropriation) during the year 2002 for the US and the UK were 9.98 and 9.71 respectively. The figure for India 
in the same period was 7.75. He further shows that for 2002 (a period covered by our sample), the value-
weighted percentage of market capitalization held by corporate insiders was 58%. This is compared to the 
figures of 16% and 11% for the US and the UK respectively. 
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based on the threshold of paid-up equity capital, only listed firms that had paid-up equity 
capital of more than or equal to Indian Rupees (INR) 30 million at any point in their traded 
history were required to comply with this CGR. Thus, the imposition of stricter provisions of 
Section 23E, along with the exogenously separated treated and control groups of firms based 
on paid-up equity capital, provides us with a regulatory set-up to empirically examine the 
following three hypotheses relating to CGR and corporate risk-taking. Our primary 
hypothesis examines whether the more stringent Section 23E, as introduced in 2004, deters or 
encourages corporate risk-taking activities in India. Second, since the literature suggests that 
investment conservatism may stem from the concentrated stakes of insiders, we examine 
whether CGR could play a moderating role in the link between risk-taking and variations in 
ownership concentration. Finally, given the evidence that CGR affects firm valuation 
positively, we test whether corporate risk-taking could potentially be an important channel in 
influencing firm valuation.4 
Employing Regression Discontinuity (RD) around the threshold of paid-up equity 
capital and propensity matched difference-in-differences (PSM-DiD) design on a sample of 
listed non-financial Indian firms for the period between 2000 and 2007, we find strong 
evidence that CGR is positively related to earnings-volatility, which is our core measure of 
corporate risk-taking. We also use capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as additional 
corporate investment proxies to assess the impact of CGR on fixed and innovative 
investments respectively. Our results are similar and economically significant with these 
additional corporate investment proxies. Overall, the results suggest that CGR that expands 
significant financial and criminal penalties for corporate insiders may mitigate their 
investment conservatism and encourage them to undertake risky and value-enhancing 
                                                 
4
 See section 3 for relevant literature and discussion on developing all three hypotheses. 
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investment projects.5 These findings are in line with the economic perspective that predicts a 
rise in corporate risk-taking activities following improvement in the corporate governance 
regime through stringent sanctions (Stulz, 2005; John et al., 2008). This key finding of our 
study is robust to a series of robustness tests, including the use of alternative control and 
treatment groups, placebo experimentation, and self-selection bias (see Section 5.4). 
Our examination of the possible moderating role of CGR on risk-taking across 
different ownership concentrations finds that, following CGR, firms with higher ownership 
concentration tend to take more risks relative to firms with lower ownership concentration. 
This result is consistent with the theoretical argument that CGR reduces the utility derived 
from private benefits and increases the utility derived from value-enhancing risky 
investments for concentrated insiders, thereby encouraging them to undertake risky 
investments (Bertrand et al., 2002; John et al., 2008; Gul et al., 2010). Finally, the results 
pertaining to the value-implication of corporate risk-taking show that, after the CGR 
enforcement period of 2004, higher risk-taking is associated with a higher market valuation 
of the treated firms. This finding suggests that risk-taking is an important channel through 
which CGR provides value to a firm. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we add to the 
ongoing debate of whether CGR deters or encourages risk-taking. Our study suggests that the 
effect of CGR on risk-taking could be context dependent, where, in an emerging market set-
up, CGR can positively affect corporate risk-taking. Although CGR could add an additional 
compliance burden, thus reducing the appetite for risk-taking (Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen 
and Dey, 2013), our study shows that CGR could substitute the missing market-based 
                                                 
5
 As Clause-49 was introduced in 2000, we also examine whether the initial introduction of CGR in 2000 has 
any visible effect on corporate risk-taking, but find no evidence of it. This additional test further suggests that 
CGR affects corporate risk-taking positively in an evolving corporate governance regime when interventions are 
accompanied by additional expansion of personal liability and stricter financial and criminal sanctions for non-
compliance (Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). 
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corporate scrutiny and reduce investment conservatism, thereby encouraging value-relevant 
risk-taking in a set-up characterized by weaker market-based corporate governance. 
Second, our paper also adds to the literature that relates ownership concentration to 
corporate risk-taking. Given the evidence that firms with concentrated insiders’ ownership 
prefer risk avoidance (Bertrand et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2010; Paligorova, 2010; Faccio et al., 
2011), we contribute by showing that CGR positively moderates the link between ownership 
concentration and risk-taking behavior of firms that would otherwise pursue investment 
conservatism. Finally, the literature supports the positive impact of CGR on firm valuation, 
specifically in the case of emerging markets (Fauver et al., 2017; Black and Khanna, 2007; 
Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). We extend this literature by suggesting that higher risk-
taking could be an important channel through which CGR may augment higher firm 
valuation. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief explanation 
of Clause-49. Section 3 develops our hypotheses, which is followed by a discussion of the 
data in Section 4. Section 5 examines the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Clause-49 
2.1. Background 
The corporate governance environment in India was largely informal prior to the 
introduction of Clause-49 in 2000 (Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). However, as Indian 
companies began to seek external financing, this led to the need for a sound regulatory 
framework for corporate governance to ensure better investor protection. In 1998, the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) introduced the voluntary Corporate Governance Code, 
which was adopted by only a few major companies. Thus, the consensus among Indian 
policy-makers was that a mandatory set of corporate governance rules was necessary. 
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Consequently, the Code evolved into the mandatory Clause-49 provisions in February 2000. 
Clause-49 of the stock exchange listing agreement is a set of CGRs enacted by the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the governing body of listed companies in India.6 
Clause-49 introduced greater compliance, as well as enhanced disclosure, transparency, and 
board independence, with initial provisions of stock delisting for non-compliance. Appendix 
1 highlights the key features of Clause-49. 
Only firms that had achieved a paid-up equity capital of more than or equal to INR 30 
million or a net worth of INR 250 million at any point in their history since being listed were 
initially subject to Clause-49. As shown in Figure 1, Clause-49 provides a phased-in 
implementation period during which larger firms are required to comply first, followed by 
mid-sized firms and, finally, small-sized firms. However, firms that are listed for the first 
time from 2000 onward are required to comply immediately, regardless of whether they meet 
the criteria of paid-up capital or net worth. This implies that our control group comprises 
firms that are listed prior to 2000 and that do not meet the two threshold criteria imposed by 
the reform. 
…Insert Figure 1 about here… 
In 2004, the amendment to the Securities Contracts Act, 1956 included Section 23E, 
which expanded the personal liabilities of the management, the board, and the audit 
committee, and imposed significant financial and criminal penalties for violations of the 
listing agreement (up to INR 250 million per violation). Further, Dharmapala and Khanna 
(2013) maintain that the threat of stricter punishment and expansion of personal liability 
                                                 
6
 Clause-49 is popularly referred to as the SOX of India. Black and Khanna (2007) offer a comparison between 
Clause-49 and SOX. Further details on Clause-49 can be obtained from the website of the SEBI 
(http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/Clause-49.html). 
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improves the expected enforcement of CGR in emerging markets. We use 2004 as the CGR 
enforcement year following previous empirical studies (Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013).  7 
2.2. Relevant Provisions of Clause-49 
Apart from an overall improvement in corporate governance, we identify three specific 
provisions in Clause-49 that should affect corporate risk-taking in Indian firms: board 
independence, independence of audit committees, and certification by the CEO or CFO. First, 
Clause-49 mandates greater board independence and requires 50% of the board of directors to 
be independent when the Chairman of the board is the executive director and one-third (33%) 
to be independent when the Chairman is a non-executive. Second, Clause-49 requires an 
affected firm to have an audit committee with a minimum of three directors, two-thirds of 
which are required to be independent, and at least one with experience in financial 
management. The Clause also requires certification by the auditor or company secretary on 
compliance with corporate governance provisions and disclosures, thereby increasing their 
accountability. Third, Clause-49 mandates certifications of the financial statements and 
internal control mechanisms by the CEO or CFO, and expands the personal accountability of 
the management and insiders on a firm’s decisions. 
Taken together, these three provisions related to structure and accountability of the 
board, the audit committee, and the management team can encourage risk-taking and value-
enhancing investments by decreasing the utility from private benefits and increasing the 
utility from the wealth effect of risky investments (John et al., 2008). At the same time, these 
provisions could also increase the compliance burden, discouraging corporate risk-taking, as 
                                                 
7
 The legal set-up for Clause-49 is such that enforcement under Section 23E (in 2004) would occur in the first 
instance by the SEBI, with a potential appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (a body formed to deal with 
securities law issues and to address SEBI appeals) and followed by a final appeal to the Supreme Court. Reports 
suggest that the number (turnaround time) of settled cases on enforcement decisions has been increasing 
(decreasing) in the post-enforcement period of 2004 on issues enforced by the SEBI and the Securities Appellate 
Tribunal. Clause-49 intervention can therefore be argued to have a reasonably clear system of handling cases of 
non-compliance. 
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documented by previous studies (Coles et al., 2008; Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen and Dey, 
2013). 
 
2.3. Self-Selection 
One concern related to Clause-49 is whether firms could endogenously self-select to be 
exposed to or remain unaffected by the reform. Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) highlight two 
scenarios in which a firm could endogenously self-select to remain unaffected by the CGR, 
based on the threshold of paid-up equity capital and how these scenarios are less likely in a 
Clause-49 set-up. First, a firm that meets the current criteria of paid-up capital may choose 
not to comply by lowering its paid-up equity capital. However, this strategy is not realistic as 
the compliance criteria are backward-looking, and the firm would have been affected by 
Clause-49 if it had reached the paid-up capital or net worth criteria at any point in its history. 
Second, a firm may have had a lower paid-up capital or net worth than the threshold required 
to comply, and may wish to abstain from raising its capital base, that is, enhance its paid-up 
capital, to remain unaffected. However, if the firm is growing in size and earnings 
significantly, then it is very likely to reach the required net worth threshold. This is because 
net worth is that part of the capital base that is adjusted for retained earnings and several 
reserves, and is therefore less likely to be manipulated. Finally, if any firm is below the 
required threshold, but wishes to be affected by the regulation, it could endogenously issue 
additional equity to reach the paid-up capital threshold. However, Dharmapala and Khanna 
(2013) empirically do not observe any such strategic manipulation in the Indian data. 
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3. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Corporate Risk-Taking and CGR 
Economic theory models the effect of CGR on firm risk-taking as a utility function of 
an insider who derives utility from the wealth effect of investments and private consumption 
of the resources of a firm (John et al., 2008). A higher level of wealth effect from investment 
is positively related to insiders’ appetite for value-enhancing risk-taking behavior. In contrast, 
a higher level of private benefit is negatively related to insiders’ appetite for value-enhancing 
risk-taking behavior. The positive effect of CGR, as elaborated below, on a firm’s risk-taking 
could stem from different channels. 
First, higher utility derived from the investment-related wealth effect could be driven 
by the reduced cost of capital as a result of better corporate governance (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert 
and Harvey, 2000; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Chen et al., 2009). There are three key arguments that explain why better corporate 
governance could lower the cost of capital. First, better corporate governance reduces 
information asymmetry between insiders and investors in the capital market through greater 
disclosure and independent monitoring, which subsequently lowers the information-related 
cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Second, progress in corporate 
governance improves stock liquidity in the market by reducing information asymmetry 
among traders (Chung et al., 2010). As liquidity is factored into the cost of capital estimation 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 2000; Easley and O'Hara, 2004), improved liquidity following 
CGR could also lower the cost of capital. Third, better investor protection attracts foreign 
investors, who play a crucial role in decreasing the cost of capital through international risk-
sharing (Errunza and Miller, 2000) and better monitoring (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), and by 
providing greater market liquidity (Errunza and Miller, 2000). 
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Second, as improved corporate monitoring lowers the magnitude and importance of the 
private benefits of insiders, CGR may discourage investment conservatism through 
independent board monitoring (Weisbach, 1988; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Fauver et al., 
2017; Lu and Wang, 2018). Similarly, harsher sanctions in mandatory CGR provisions 
increase the disciplinary pressure on insiders and may reduce the insiders’ expected private 
consumption. Taken together, an improvement in CGR could therefore increase the utility 
from the investment-related wealth effect and decrease the utility from private benefits, both 
of which could encourage higher value-enhancing risk-taking. 
Contrary to this positive prediction, studies also document evidence of the negative 
association between CGR and a firm’s risk-taking behavior (Coles et al., 2008; Bargeron at 
el., 2010; Cohen and Dey, 2013). Previous studies suggest that stricter provisions of CGR, 
which assign expanded financial and criminal liabilities, increase risk-aversion and thus 
discourage decision-makers from taking on value-maximizing risky investments (Bargeron at 
el., 2010). Similarly, it is argued that for growing and innovative firms, greater external 
monitoring may be expensive (Coles et al., 2008). As CGR expands the role and number of 
external directors, this increased cost of independent monitoring could further dampen 
insiders’ risk-taking appetite (Coles et al., 2008; Cohen and Dey, 2013). 
Therefore, in hypothesis one (H1), we empirically test the following two conflicting 
views on the role of CGR in corporate risk-taking. 
 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, enforcement of CGR should increase corporate risk-taking. 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, enforcement of CGR should decrease corporate risk-taking. 
 
3.2. CGR, Ownership Concentration, and Risk-taking. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
 
An emerging market set-up characterized by the prevalence of concentrated ownership 
structures, where few concentrated owners have full control over corporate decisions and 
resources, witnesses a higher conflict of interest between dominant insiders and minority 
outsiders (Stulz, 2005; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). These concentrated owners could opt 
for lower risk-taking because of two important reasons. 
First, concentrated insiders would derive higher utility of private benefits because of 
their higher control over corporate resources, which could incentivize them to pursue 
investment conservatism (Bertrand et al., 2002; John et al., 2008; Gul et al., 2010). CGR 
should reduce the expected utility from such private benefits by increasing the likelihood of 
monitoring and prosecuting misappropriation (Aggarwal et al., 2008; John et al., 2008). This 
reduction in the utility of private benefits could thus encourage risk-taking. 
Second, concentrated insiders may choose to avoid risk-taking because of their under-
diversified stake in a firm. For example, Paligorova (2010) finds that, compared to 
institutional counterparts like mutual funds, banks, financial, and industrial companies, 
concentrated individuals and large family shareholders tend to indulge in lower corporate 
risk-taking, largely due to their under-diversified stakes. Similarly, Faccio et al. (2011) note 
that large undiversified shareholders pursue more conservative investment policies. As CGR 
expands the influence of minority shareholders in corporate decision-making, this shift could 
positively induce the risk-taking activities of otherwise conservative firms because of 
concentrated ownership. 
We therefore expect higher risk-taking in firms with higher ownership concentration, 
when compared to their counterparts with lower ownership concentration, following CGR. 
Accordingly, we state the following second hypothesis (H2): 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, enforcement of CGR should increase corporate risk-taking in firms with 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
 
greater ownership concentration. 
 
3.3. CGR and the Value-Implication of Risk-taking 
Existing studies find a positive role of CGR on a firm’s market valuation (Black and 
Khanna, 2007; Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013; Fauver et al., 2017). Specifically, Black and 
Khanna (2007) and Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) show that CGR interventions in an 
emerging market context are value-enhancing. However, the channels through which CGR 
influences firm valuation are less clear. 
Related literature also posits that higher corporate risk-taking should increase the 
market valuation of firms (John et al., 2008; Faccio et al., 2011). Aligning this empirical 
evidence with the possibility that CGR could positively affect corporate risk-taking, we argue 
that corporate risk-taking could therefore be the channel through which CGR translates into 
higher firm valuation. In other words, the market rewards the positive shift in risk-taking of 
firms following CGR with a higher valuation. Accordingly, our third hypothesis (H3) is as 
follows: 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, following the enforcement of CGR, firms with higher corporate risk-
taking should have higher market value. 
 
4. Data 
Our primary source of data is the Prowess database, maintained by the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess provides detailed annual financial data and 
other firm-specific variables of both listed and unlisted public limited companies.8 For our 
study, we primarily use all non-financial firms available in the database for the sample period 
                                                 
8
 The database has been used by a number of studies, including Lilienfeld-Toal et al. (2012), Vig (2013), and 
Gopalan et al. (2016). 
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of 2000 to 2007 listed in or before 2000. For our examination of cross-listed Indian firms, we 
obtained the relevant data from Dharmapala and Khanna (2013).9 Our dataset consists of a 
sample of 26,584 firm-year observations of 3,839 non-financial firms listed on either the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) or the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) for the 
period 2000 to 2007 for which there are no missing data for at least one of the three proxies 
used in the analysis.10 A description of the variables used in the study is also provided in 
Appendix 2, and a breakdown of the sample by industry is shown in Appendix 3. We use the 
Prowess database code to identify industries and group them into 22 broad industry sectors 
following Vig (2013). 
 
4.1. Risk-Taking and Corporate Investment Proxies 
Following the literature, we use earnings-volatility as our prime variable to capture 
corporate risk-taking in our empirical testing (John et al., 2008; Faccio et al., 2011; Boubakri 
et al., 2013). As riskier projects exhibit higher volatility, earnings-volatility captures the 
degree of risk-taking in a firm’s operations, based on the volatility of the operating earnings 
(John et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2013). We calculate earnings-volatility as the three-year 
rolling standard deviation of earnings, where earnings is measured using earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) expressed as a percentage of total 
assets. 
To gauge the effect of CGR on fixed and innovative investments, we also use two other 
alternative dependent variables: capital expenditure and R&D expenditure. Both of these 
measures of corporate investments are shown to be linked to risk-taking and have been used 
widely in the literature on risk-taking (Bargeron et al, 2010; Belloc, 2013; Koh and Reeb, 
                                                 
9
 We thank Dhammika Dharmapala and Vikramaditya Khanna for sharing their data on cross -listed Indian firms 
before the enforcement of Clause-49. We also matched the data on cross -listed Indian firms with those collected 
from the website www.adr.com. 
10
 Prowess variables are reported as of March 31, each year. Therefore, we use March -end financial data for a 
given year as previous year-end data. 
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2015). Capital expenditure captures the size of tangible investments. It is computed as the 
difference between long-term assets for year “t” and year “t-1” scaled by long-term assets for 
year “t-1.” R&D expenditure reflects a firm’s level of innovative investments (Bargeron at 
el., 2010; Belloc, 2013) and is measured as the total monetary value of research and 
development expenditure scaled by total assets.11 
 
4.2. Control Variables 
We use a number of control variables that could also explain the cross-sectional and 
temporal variations of corporate risk-taking. Studies show that the size of a firm can play a 
key role in the ability and appetite of the firm to make investment decisions (Whited and Wu, 
2006). We control for Size by taking the natural logarithm of total assets where assets are 
expressed in millions of INR. We also account for the capital structure of the firm 
(Leverage), as investment decisions and risk-taking are directly affected by access to finance 
(Almeida and Campello, 2007; Campello et al., 2010). Similarly, creditors can have interests 
that are different from those of shareholders in the risk-taking of a firm, because of their 
fiduciary stake and their concave payoffs (Acharya et al., 2011). We measure Leverage as the 
book value of debt-to-equity ratio. The literature also establishes an association between a 
firm’s operating liquidity (cash holding) and levels of corporate risk-taking (Denis and 
Sibilkov, 2010). For example, if firms expect financing uncertainty, those with higher 
investment needs can build up liquidity to hedge against a possible future credit shock. 
Liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities. 
Promoters, as they are the founding members and insiders of a firm, can affect the level 
of corporate risk-taking (John et al., 2008). We control for ownership concentration 
(OwnCon) as the proportion of total shares held by promoters. Finally, risk-taking may also 
                                                 
11 Any missing R&D expenditure observations are not treated as zero, as Koh and Reeb (2015) suggest that 
firms for which R&D expenses are missing are significantly different from zero R&D firms. This exclusion 
significantly reduces the number of observations available for regressions with R&D Expenditure. 
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be influenced by the growth potential of firms, as argued by the literature on finance and 
growth (Levine, 2003). The growth potential of the firms is proxied by the ratio of market 
value of equity to its book value, Market-to-Book (MB). As corporate risk-taking may differ 
on the basis of time invariant firm-specific characteristics, such as gender (Faccio et al., 
2016), we control for Firm Fixed Effect in our empirical models. Finally, we control for Year 
Fixed Effect to capture the effect of time-events driving our results. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the dependent and control variables for the 
entire sample, as well as for the pre-CGR (2000-2003) and post-CGR periods (2004-2007). It 
shows a statistically significant growth (at the 1% significance level) in firms’ earnings-
volatility (5.83% to 7.20%), capital expenditure (11.46% to 14.03%), and R&D expenditure 
(1.25% to 1.68%) in the post-CGR period in comparison with the pre-CGR period. Three of 
the controls (Size, Liquidity, and MB) also witnessed a significant increase in the post-CGR 
period. However, Leverage decreased significantly,12 and there was no significant change in 
OwnCon in the post-CGR period. These descriptive differences offer some preliminary 
evidence that the enforcement of CGR could have increased the corporate risk-taking 
behavior of the firms. 
…Insert Table 1 about here… 
5.1.1. Clause-49 Groups 
Our treated group comprises listed Indian firms affected by Clause-49 and control 
group firms unaffected by CGR. By construction, the treated firms are larger than the control 
                                                 
12
 A decrease in leverage may suggest the creditors’ response to increased risk-taking on part of the firm. 
Alternatively, this may also imply attractiveness of equity financing when compared to debt financing in the 
post-2004 period. 
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firms. We address the issue of comparability by generating four different groups, depending 
on when the firms were affected by Clause-49 (based on the paid-up equity capital threshold). 
Group 1 comprises the larger Indian firms (listed as flag “A” in BSE), which were required to 
comply by March 31, 2001. Group 2 comprises mid-sized firms with paid-up equity capital of 
at least INR 100 million or net worth of INR 250 million at any point since their 
incorporation. These firms were required to comply by March 31, 2002. Group 3 (3A and 3B) 
comprises small-sized firms with paid-up equity capital between INR 30 million and INR 100 
million, and were required to comply by March 31, 2003. Group 3A consists of firms with 
paid-up capital ranging between INR 45 million and INR 100 million, and Group 3B consists 
of firms with paid-up capital ranging between INR 30 million and INR 45 million. Group 4A 
firms have paid-up equity capital ranging between INR 15 million and INR 30 million. Group 
4B comprises firms with paid-up equity capital less than INR 15 million. Firms in Group 4 
(4A and 4B) were not affected by Clause-49. 
We present firm characteristics prior to CGR for all the four different groups in Table 
2. The discontinuity around the paid-up equity capital threshold separates Group 3 firms (3A 
and 3B) as treated firms, whereas Group 4 firms (4A and 4B), which are the control firms, 
remain unaffected by our CGR. This exogenous separation of firms into treated and control 
groups by Clause-49 allows us to employ RD and difference-in-differences (DiD) designs for 
empirical investigation. 
 
…Insert Table 2 about here… 
5.2. Main Results 
The RD approach is able to credibly estimate the causal effect of CGR on the risk-
taking of treated firms. Further, RD design also overcomes concerns about the alternative 
effects driven by firms that may be far away from the paid-up equity capital threshold at 
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which CGR was applicable. Our main results are based on the RD and DiD research designs. 
5.2.1. Regression Discontinuity (RD) Test 
Following Lemieux and Milligan (2008) we conduct a RD test on the cross-section of 
firms for two years of post-CGR period (i.e., 2004-2005), as shown in equation (1). 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽. 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1) + 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝜗𝑗 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , (1) 
where 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1)  is a categorical variable taking the value of one for firms with paid-up 
equity capital of equal to or greater than INR 30 million and zero otherwise. 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is 
earnings-volatility as defined in the earlier section (i is indexed as the firm and t as the year). 
We use two additional corporate investment proxies (capital expenditure and R&D 
expenditure) as additional dependent variables. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of key control variables as 
defined earlier and 𝜗𝑗  is industry fixed effects. Our key coefficient of interest, 𝛽, is the 
discontinuity estimator of the causal effect of CGR on the treated firms. The main 
identification assumption of the RD approach is that 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖) is a smooth function of 
paid-up equity capital: that is, 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖) controls for any continuous impact of paid-up 
equity capital on a firm’s risk-taking in 2004 and 2005.13 
We report the results from the RD analysis in Table 3. Models (1) to (3) report 
coefficients for entire sample firms, whereas models (4) to (6) report coefficients only for 
firms in Groups 3 and 4, as described above. Table 3 shows that the coefficients on risk-
taking and corporate investment measures are both positive and significant (at least at the 5% 
significance level), implying a discontinuous increase in risk-taking and corporate investment 
on the part of treated firms in 2004 and 2005. Similarly, compared to the entire sample, the 
coefficients of the threshold dummy for risk-taking and corporate investment proxies are 
higher in magnitude in sub-sample firms (reported in Models 4 to 6), which implies a 
                                                 
13
 In the results reported in Table 3 we assume 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖 ) to be linear in paid-up equity capital. However, 
the results are consistent with the polynomial functional form for 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖 ). 
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stronger increase in corporate risk-taking in treated firms that are closer to the threshold. This 
result supports hypothesis 1a and rejects hypothesis 1b. 
In terms of control variables, OwnCon is negatively related to all the proxies of risk-
taking and corporate investments, and is consistently significant (at least at 10%) across 
different models and subsamples. This result is in line with the theoretical prediction that 
ownership concentration encourages a firm to pursue investment conservatism. Size seems to 
affect earnings-volatility and R&D expenditure negatively, and capital expenditure 
positively. Similarly, MB is significant and positively associated (at the 1% significance 
level) with risk-taking and corporate investment measures, implying the value relevance of 
risk-taking. Coefficients of Leverage and Liquidity also have the expected signs, even though 
they are not consistently significant across the models. 
 
…Insert Table 3 about here… 
5.2.2. Propensity Score Matched Difference-in-Differences (PSM-DiD) Regression 
Although the RD regression of the cross-section of firms around the threshold of paid-
up equity capital provides evidence of the positive effect of CGR on firm risk-taking, there 
are other factors besides paid-up equity capital that may affect corporate risk-taking. We 
therefore apply Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to the firms around the threshold of paid-
up equity capital to generate the most comparable treated and control firms and run a PSM-
DiD regression for this subset of firms14 in Group 3 (treated firms) and Group 4 (control 
firms). 
…Insert Table 4 about here… 
In applying PSM, we first estimate a probit model using firms in Groups 3 and 4. The 
                                                 
14
 Additionally, we run DiD regression from two highly comparable treated (Group 3B) and control (Group 4A) 
firms from Table 2 clustered around the cut-off of paid-up capital of INR 30 million, and that are generally 
similar in terms of size and other firm characteristics and find that significantly  positive DiD estimates are in 
line with hypothesis 1a. These results can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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dependent variable is equal to one if the firm belongs to Group 3 and zero if it belongs to 
Group 4. The probit model includes all control variables from equation (2). We use 
propensity scores estimated from Model (1) of Panel A in Table 4 to perform matching 
between treated and control firms, using the closest propensity score, following Smith and 
Todd (2005). This generates 171 pairs of matched firms from Groups 3 and 4. To examine 
whether treated and control firms generated from the PSM technique reduce the possible 
observable differences among treated and control groups prior to CGR enforcement, we 
further run the probit model with the matched sub-sample alone as a diagnostic test. As 
shown in Model (2) of Panel A in Table 4, no independent variables are significant in 
explaining the assignment of these matched firms into treated and control groups. In addition, 
the pseudo 𝑅2 decreases sharply from 0.113, prior to the matching, to 0.023, following the 
PSM, thereby reducing the explanatory power of the model with the matched firms. This 
diagnostic test in Model 2 indicates that matching reduces possible observable differences 
among treated and control groups prior to CGR enforcement. 
 To assess the pre-CGR and post-CGR trends in risk-taking of the matched treated and 
control group within groups 3 and 4, we present the time series of yearly average figures of 
earnings-volatility of these comparable firms for the period between 2000 and 2007 in Figure 
2.  
…Insert Figure 2 about here… 
We see in Figure 2 that the control firms do not show a significant change in the trend 
following the 2004 CGR. Further, the visual impression of Figure 2 shows that both the 
treated and control groups do not have significant differences in their pre-CGR trends. 
However, following CGR, the treated firms show a significant increase in risk-taking, in line 
with hypothesis 1a. 
For estimating the causal effect of CGR on corporate risk-taking in the sample of these 
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matched treated and control firms, we run the following regression specification (2): 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) .1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 
𝑿𝒊𝒕 .𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable as defined in the earlier section (i is indexed as the 
firm and t as the year). 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
treated firms and zero for control firms. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)  in Equation (2) is a categorical variable 
that takes the value of one for the post-CGR period and zero otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of key 
control variables as defined earlier. 𝛾𝑖  is the firm fixed effect and 𝜏𝑡 is the time fixed effect. 
DiD coefficient, 𝛽, is the coefficient of interaction term 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1), and 
measures the causal effect of CGR on the treated firms.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we report the PSM-DiD regression results. It shows that the DiD 
coefficients of risk-taking and corporate investment proxies for these matched firms are 
significantly positive (at the 1% significance level). We also present the univariate mean DiD 
estimates of PSM firms for all risk-taking and corporate investment measures in Panel C, and 
find positive and significant univariate DiD estimates that are consistent with the results in 
Panel B. The results in Table 4 support hypothesis 1a further, and reject hypothesis 1b. 
5.3. The Effect of the Introduction of Clause-49 in 2000 on Corporate Risk-taking 
Our empirical investigation so far has followed prior literature and we use the 2004 
expansion of personal liabilities in CGR as the enforcement year. In this section, we examine 
whether the initial introduction of Clause-49 in 2000 has an effect on corporate risk-taking. 
To do so, we run a DiD panel regression, as in equation (2). However, the 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)  of 
equation (2) in this case takes the value of one for years from 2000 to 2002 and zero for years 
from 1997 to 1999. Control and treated firms are all non-financial, domestically listed firms, 
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as defined in the notes to Table 2. Control variables include all except OwnCon, as defined in 
the notes to Table 1. OwnCon does not appear as a control variable, as data on OwnCon are 
available only for 2001. Table 5 reports the findings for the proxies of risk-taking and 
corporate investments. We find that the introduction of CGR in 2000 does not have a 
significant effect on risk-taking of treated firms.15 
…Insert Table 5 about here… 
Why do we fail to see any change in corporate risk-taking after the introduction of 
Clause-49? It is important to note that the initial penalty for non-compliance was delisting. 
Delisting is considered to be a significant sanction to deter non-compliance of regulatory 
provisions, as it affects, among others, a firm’s access to and cost of external capital (Stulz, 
1999; Brav, 2009). To examine this surprising finding further, we hand-collected data on 
delisting from 2000 to 2007. Our data show that 1,245 firms were delisted between 2000 and 
2007, of which only 20 firms were delisted on the ground of non-compliance with 
regulations. Only 12 firms were delisted for non-compliance with SEBI regulations not 
related to Clause-49, with no firm delisted on the ground of violating Clause-49. On the basis 
of this evidence, we argue that, in the absence of any actual delisting, the threat of being 
delisted as a penalty might not be robust enough to induce the expected changes in corporate 
behavior, particularly in the context of emerging markets (Dutcher, 2005; Dharmapala and 
Khanna, 2013; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013).16 
The use of robust penalties to induce changes in corporate behavior is also supported by 
existing studies that highlight the importance of stronger sanctions for non-compliance 
                                                 
15 As Clause-49 is a phased-in reform affecting different treated groups in different times, in addition to 
investigating the introduction effect, as shown in Table 5, in an unreported table, we also examine the DiD 
regression using equation (2). We redefine 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 −49=1)  as a categorical variable which takes the value of one 
if a firm is affected by Clause-49 in a year and zero otherwise, and an event indicator variable, 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  which 
takes the value of one for three years following the applicability of clause-49 until 2003 and zero otherwise. The 
results are consistent, with no significant introduction effect as presented in Table 5. 
16
 Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) state that on average effective enforcement in advanced economies is twice as 
high as in emerging and transition economies. 
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(Dutcher, 2005).17 For example, Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) in their investigation of 
CGR in India note that the prospect of public enforcement actions, in the form of expanded 
financial sanctions and criminal liabilities for non-compliance, may act as a strong stimulus 
to deter insiders from diverting corporate resources for their personal benefit.18 They also 
argue that in the absence of stricter enforcement provisions, even firms that are willing to 
adopt, or have already adopted, better corporate governance practices could incur significant 
costs to convince outside investors credibly. Further, the addition of more severe sanctions is 
a strong signal of greater reputational penalties. Consistent with the argument that sanctions 
need to be adequate to induce expected changes in corporate behavior (Dutcher, 2005), our 
findings highlight the importance of stricter CGR sanctions in stimulating corporate risk-
taking.19 
 
5.4. Robustness Checks for Hypothesis 1. 
Although we control for various firm-level characteristics, and firm and year fixed 
effects, in our examination of hypotheses 1a and 1b, there could be other differences in our 
treated and control groups that could have an impact on corporate risk-taking. Alternatively, 
our results could capture other contemporaneous shocks. We address these alternative 
                                                 
17
 Becker’s (1968) economic model notes that maximizing punishments for non-compliance, particularly 
monetary fines, may encourage expected enforcement. 
18
 However, there is now some evidence that SEBI is imposing sanctions for non -compliance. For example, 
www.livemint.com notes the following for the year ending December 31, 2013: “As part of the initial action, the 
two exchanges (BSE and NSE) have imposed penalties and suspended trading in companies’ shares mostly for 
non-compliance with clauses 35 and 49. BSE has imposed a total fine of Rs. 2.56 crores on companies 
breaching clause 35, and a fine of Rs. 44.54 crores for non-compliance with Clause-49. NSE has imposed a total 
fine of Rs. 9.34 lakhs on 32 firms. This fine amount will keep increasing since it is imposed on a per-day basis.” 
[Source (https://www.livemint.com/Money/BnUE7CAEJ5TUi6RApPwO6M/BSE-NSE-find-widespread-
violation-of-listing-norms.html) accessed 4 June 2018, 18.23 BST] 
19
 To reduce the possibility that industry-specific shocks like changes in investment opportunities and/ or 
competition across different industries could confound our results, we interact with the industry dummy, which 
takes a unique value for each industry, as defined in Appendix 3, with the year dummies and run DiD regression 
with firm fixed effect and the interaction of industry and year. The results, which are unreported but can be 
obtained from the authors, are robust when we control for this effect in our model lending support to hypothesis 
1a. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
 
explanations through a series of robustness checks in the following sub-sections, which 
strengthen the causality claim of the positive effect of CGR on corporate risk-taking further. 
 
5.4.1. Addressing Pre-CGR Corporate Governance Differences among Firms 
It is possible that some of the firms within the treated group could be those that were 
exposed to a higher level of governance standards before CGR in 2004. Hence, their 
inclusion in our sample as treated firms, could lead to a bias in our results. We deal with this 
issue by identifying 84 firms within the treated group that are cross-listed in international 
exchanges as at or before 2004 and employ them as our alternative control group. Existing 
studies suggest that internationally cross-listed firms, particularly of emerging markets, 
exhibit superior corporate governance when compared to their domestic counterparts since 
the cross-listed firms need to comply with the higher CGR requirement of the developed 
market listing agreement (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 2002; Karolyi, 2012).20 Therefore, we 
maintain that the effect of domestic CGR intervention should have a smaller effect on the 
corporate governance practices of cross-listed Indian firms, relative to firms listed 
domestically alone. 
One potential concern regarding the comparability of cross-listed firms with the entire 
sample of domestically listed treated firms is that these firms, on average, are of larger size 
when compared to overall treated firms. To address this, we generate a size-decile of all 
treated firms (excluding the cross-listed firms) based on average size (natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets in millions of INR) before 2004, and assign size-matched treated 
firms to firms falling in the uppermost size-decile (average size of 8.85 versus 8.86 of cross-
listed firms prior to 2004 CGR). We repeat the PSM as described in Section 5.2.2 from this 
                                                 
20
 The superiority of corporate governance of cross -listed firms is explained by the bonding argument. The 
argument contends that the prevalence of potential agency conflicts in firms in emerging economies, in large  
part, is a result of fragile regulatory oversight, inadequate transparency, and disclosure requirements, as well as 
weak legal protection of minority investors. To overcome these deficiencies in governance, firms in developing 
markets choose to bond themselves credibly with the legal and financial institutions of developed markets by 
means of international cross-listing (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 2002; Karolyi, 2012). 
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size-matched universe of treated firms and obtain 81 pairs of propensity score matched 
treated firms and cross-listed firms as an alternative control group. 
Table 6 reports PSM-DiD regressions of these size-matched treated firms.21 In line with 
our main findings in Tables 3 and 4, the DiD coefficients of these matched groups, as 
reported in Panel B of Table 6, are positive and significant (at the 1% significance level). The 
results from univariate DiD estimates in Panel C are also consistent with our main results. 
Thus, the use of cross-listed firms as an alternative control group reduces the possibility of 
our results supporting hypothesis 1a. They are driven by pre-CGR corporate governance 
differences among treated firms. 
…Insert Table 6 about here… 
5.4.2. Placebo Test 
Our main tests rely on the premise that there is no notable economy-wide shock in 
2004, other than the enforcement of Clause-49, as an explanation of the systematic changes 
observed in corporate risk-taking. From our examination of the political economy of India 
through media coverage and previous empirical studies, we find no such economy-wide 
shock in 2004. However, it could be that our results are simply reflecting the effect of 
confounding shocks before or after the 2004 intervention or continuation of pre-existing 
trend. To address this, we use a placebo test. We design two pseudo-shock periods, one for 
2002 (two years before the enforcement shock) and the other for 2006 (two years after the 
enforcement shock). Our treated and control groups remain the same as determined by 
Clause-49. We re-run regression equation (2), this time altering the dummy variable 
1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)  to 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  which takes the value of one for years 2002 and 2003 for False-
Experiment 1 (FSY=2002) and zero for two years before 2002. Similarly, for False-
                                                 
21
 The dependent variable of the probit model in Panel A in Table 6 is a dummy variable which t akes the value 
of one if a firm is cross-listed in or before 2004, and zero if it is a Clause-49 affected firm in the uppermost size 
decile before 2004, and not cross-listed. The covariates for propensity score estimation in column 1 of Panel A 
are the same as in equation (2). 
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Experiment 2 (FSY=2006), 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  is one for the years 2006 and 2007 and zero for 
two years before 2006. 
Table 7 reports the DiD regression results from these false experiments. The estimates 
of risk-taking and corporate investment proxies show an insignificant effect for both 2002 
and 2006, suggesting that confounding events around CGR are not driving our results.22 
…Insert Table 7 about here… 
 
 
5.5. Channels through which CGR Affects Risk-taking. 
 In the discussion of possible channels through which CGR could affect risk-taking in 
Section 3.1, we contend that a firm’s risk-taking is related positively to insiders’ utility from 
the wealth effect of investments and negatively to insiders’ utility from private benefits. In 
this section we examine changes in the magnitude of the key channels in the post-CGR 
period compared to their pre-CGR values. We maintain that changes in these metrics 
following the CGR could encourage corporate risk-taking. 
5.5.1. Cost of Equity Capital 
As discussed in Section 3.1, we explore whether cost of equity capital has reduced 
significantly in the post-2004 period, which could lead to higher positive net present value 
(NPV) investments. We examine the dividend yield of our sample firms as a proxy of cost of 
equity capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2006). 
We compute the dividend yield as a ratio of dividend paid per share to the market price per 
share of a firm’s common stock. Table 8 shows a 0.35 percentage points decrease (significant 
at the 1% significance level) in the dividend yield of treated firms, whereas the change in the 
                                                 
22
 In an unreported Table, with 2003 (one year before true experiment year) as the false experiment year, we 
find the results to be consistent with Table 7. However, the placebo test, with 2005 as the false experiment year, 
shows a significant positive effect, which is consistent with the expectation that the effect of the CGR on risk-
taking is persistent for 2005. 
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dividend yield of control firms is not significant. This reduction in the cost of equity capital 
following CGR in 2004 could have encouraged corporate risk-taking. 
…Insert Table 8 about here… 
5.5.2. Liquidity 
We explore whether a decrease in cost of capital is associated with improvement in 
stock liquidity. To do so, we examine the changes in liquidity measures for the treated and 
control groups following the 2004 reform in Clause-49. We use two widely used measures of 
liquidity. First, we use the Amihud (2002) Illiquidity Ratio (ILR) as measured by the annual 
average ratio of absolute daily return to the daily trading volume. The second illiquidity 
measure that we use is the number of days with zero returns (DZR) as a proportion of total 
trading days in a year (Bekaert et al., 2007).23 Table 8 shows that the Amihud ILR of treated 
firms decreases sharply by 0.186 units (significant at the 1% significance level) in 
comparison to a slight (0.088 units) decrease in control firms. Similarly, the DZR of treated 
firms decreases by 6.17 percentage points (significant at the 1% significance level) in 
comparison with an increase of 1.69 percentage points for the control groups. Overall, both 
illiquidity measures show a significant decrease for treated firms post-CGR when compared 
to those of control firms (significant negative DiD estimates at the 1% significance level). 
The improvement in (lowering of) liquidity (illiquidity) could encourage investment in 
positive NPV projects through a reduced cost of capital. 
 
5.5.3 Foreign Ownership 
The increased presence of foreign investors can reduce the cost of capital through 
higher monitoring (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) and international risk-sharing (Errunza and 
                                                 
23
 ILR enables a relationship between the changes in stock price and trading volume. A lower ILR implies 
higher market liquidity. Zero returns occur when the cost of transactions becomes greater than the value of 
information for the informed trader, therefore reflecting concerns of the liquidity in informed trades on returns 
of securities (Lesmond, 2005; Bekaert et al., 2007). Further, greater transaction costs lead to a higher number of 
zero returns. 
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Miller, 2000). To examine the changes in the ownership of foreign investors in our sample, 
we compute foreign equity ownership of the treated and control firms before and after CGR. 
We measure foreign equity ownership as a ratio of the number of shares held by foreign non-
promoter shareholders to the total number of shares held by all non-promoters. Table 8 shows 
that treated firms witness an average increase of 6.12 percentage points in foreign ownership 
(significant at the 1% significance level) in comparison with the insignificant increase of 0.31 
percentage points for control firms. The univariate DiD estimate is a positive 5.81 percentage 
points and statistically significant at the 1% level. Increased foreign investors following CGR 
of 2004 could reduce the cost of capital and improve monitoring, both of which can 
encourage value-enhancing risk-taking. 
5.5.4. Board Independence 
Studies note that independent directors are often valued for working in favor of 
shareholders by disciplining managers (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Board independence could 
positively affect value-enhancing corporate risk-taking in firms where insiders or managers 
are more likely to be risk-averse in pursuing more conservative investments (Lu and Wang, 
2018). Similarly, independent boards are important for yielding innovative outcomes (Sena et 
al., 2018). The value-enhancing effect of independent directors increases when CGR 
mandates crucial roles for them, such as sitting on audit committees (Nguyen and Nielsen, 
2010). Board independence can be an important channel in encouraging investment in 
wealth-creating risky projects, as better monitoring and accountability can reduce private 
consumption (Johnson et al., 2000; John et al., 2008; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). To 
assess this channel, we calculate an Independent Board metric as a ratio of the number of 
independent board members to the total number of board members. As expected, and implied 
by the provisions of Clause-49, Table 8 shows that the Independent Board of treated firms 
increases by 7.71 percentage points in the post-CGR period when compared to a relatively 
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smaller increase (2.17 percentage points) of independent boards of the control firms in the 
same period. 
To sum up, our examination of the potential channels through which CGR can impact 
risk-taking and corporate investments shows that, following CGR, treated firms experience 
lower cost of capital, potentially resulting from higher liquidity, a higher presence of foreign 
investors, and better scrutiny of corporate decisions through a greater degree of board 
independence. Similarly, an increase in independent monitoring by an independent board and 
foreign owners can help reduce the utility from expected private benefits, thereby 
encouraging value-maximizing risk-taking and corporate investments. Taken together, the 
shift in these factors is likely to encourage corporate risk-taking of treated firms in post-CGR 
period, in line with hypothesis 1a. 
 
5.6. Ownership Concentration and the Role of CGR 
In this section, we examine hypothesis 2 by using the difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DiDiD) estimation as shown in equation (3): 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜔. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) .𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜒. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1).𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) +
𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡
 (3) 
where 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the two-year average of promoters’ shareholding before the 
enforcement of Clause-49. The coefficient 𝜔 estimates the impact of CGR on the cross-
section of treated firms based on the heterogeneity of their ownership concentration prior to 
CGR. For CGR to stimulate positive corporate risk-taking among firms with higher 
ownership concentration, 𝜔 of Equation (3) should be positive. 
To examine hypothesis 2, we proxy ownership concentration as the percentage of 
shares owned by promoting shareholders. We calculate the two-year average of promoters’ 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
 
shareholding before the enforcement of Clause-49 to generate heterogeneity in ownership 
structure prior to Clause-49 enforcement and make the variable interact with 
1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) .1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  to obtain the triple interaction term: DiDiD-
OwnCon= 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  as shown in Equation (3). 
Table 9 reports the DiDiD-OwnCon coefficients without and with controls. Without 
controls (Model 1), the coefficients of DiDiD-OwnCon for earnings-volatility, capital 
expenditure, and R&D expenditure of treated firms show significant positive values of 0.05, 
0.10, and 0.01 percentage points respectively (significant at the 1% level). The results are 
consistent when we include all the controls in Model 2 for all three proxies of risk-taking and 
corporate investments. Overall, the results suggest that in comparison with the treated peers 
with lower ownership concentration, corporate risk-taking of treated firms with higher 
ownership concentration has significantly increased, following the enforcement of CGR, 
supporting hypothesis 2. This is consistent with the argument that improvements in corporate 
governance enable firms, which are otherwise conservative because of insiders’ dominance, 
to make more value-enhancing risky investment decisions (Stulz, 2005; John et al., 2008; 
Paligorova, 2010; Boubakri et al., 2013). 
…Insert Table 9 about here… 
 
5.7. CGR, Risk-Taking, and Firm Value 
In hypothesis 3 we argue that risk-taking could be an important channel through which 
the enforcement of CGR provides higher firm valuation. To test this conjecture, we 
investigate whether an increase in corporate risk-taking and corporate investments following 
CGR is associated with higher firm valuation. To do so, we use a panel regression with firm 
value as the explanatory variable, as presented in equation (4): 
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𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1). 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) +
𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) . + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 .𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡
 
(4) 
 
where we proxy firm value using Tobin’s Q, computed as the ratio of the sum of total 
liabilities, book value of preferred stock, and market value of equity to the book value of total 
assets. We use book value, rather than the market value of preferred stock, because 
preference shares are traded very thinly in the Indian market during the study period. All 
control variables, except MB, remain as specified in equation (2). 
1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) .𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) is an interaction term 
where Risk-taking (corporate investments) is gauged by earnings-volatility (capital 
expenditure and R&D expenditure), and 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) and 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  are as defined in 
equation (2).  
We report the results of the estimation in Table 10. Models 1 to 6 report the results of 
equation (4) without and with controls for each instance of risk-taking and corporate 
investment proxies as well. The results in Models 1 and 2 show that the firm value of higher 
risk-taking treated firms is significantly greater (at the 1% level) than that of lower risk-
taking firms (minimum value of 0.04 in Model 1). In terms of economic magnitude, this 
implies a one standard deviation increase in a firm’s risk-taking, as proxied by earnings-
volatility, is associated with a minimum of 0.274 units increase in the Tobin’s Q of treated 
firms (with an average standard deviation of earnings-volatility of 6.85 percentage points).24 
The value relevance proposition also holds for capital expenditure (Models 3 and 4) and 
R&D expenditure (Models 5 and 6). 
                                                 
24
 With standard deviation of earnings-volatility at 6.85 percentage points, the coefficient of 0.04 translates to 
0.274 units (=0.04*6.85). 
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…Insert Table 10 about here… 
 
There could be a possibility that the risk-taking and corporate investment proxies could 
overlap in terms of information content. In order to assess whether these measures contribute 
to higher firm valuation separately, as reported in Table 10, we run a horse-race procedure by 
including the triple interaction terms of these risk-taking and corporate investment measures 
together in a single model. Model 7 reports the interaction terms of earnings-volatility and 
capital expenditure together, and Model 8 uses triple interaction terms of all three proxies of 
risk-taking and corporate investments. We report Models 7 and 8 separately as the 
incorporation of the triple interaction with R&D expenditure in Model 8 significantly reduces 
the number of observations. Models 7 and 8 show that each of the three proxies of risk-taking 
and corporate investments is individually significant at the 1% level and contributes to higher 
firm valuation in the post-CGR period. 
Finally, in Model 9 of Table 10, we replicate the evidence of Dharmapala and Khanna 
(2013) and find that firm valuation has increased in an economically meaningful magnitude 
in the post-CGR period. Our findings are consistent with those of Dharmapala and Khanna 
(2013). However, when compared to Model 8 (and Model 7) where we control for the 
contribution from risk-taking and corporate investments, the economic magnitude of the DiD 
coefficient reduces both in magnitude (from 0.89 to 0.38) and statistical significance, 
suggesting that a significant portion of value derived by the treated firms after the CGR is 
associated with higher risk-taking by these firms. These results further support our view that 
corporate risk-taking is an important channel through which CGR affects a firm’s value, 
supporting hypothesis 3. 
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6. Conclusion 
The debate on the effect of CGR on corporate investment decisions is a matter of 
concern for policy-makers. The literature provides two different theoretical perspectives on 
the effect of CGR on a firm’s corporate risk-taking. One argument is that stricter CGR 
sanctions, which expand the financial and personal liability of corporate insiders for 
corporate affairs, increase the compliance burden and discourage insiders from undertaking 
value-enhancing risky investment decisions. On the other hand, expected utility from private 
benefits of the dominant insiders could favor investment conservatism to the extent of 
passing up positive NPV risky investments. CGR limits expected private benefits of the 
insiders through independent scrutiny and transparency, thereby encouraging these insiders to 
pursue value-enhancing risk-taking. The possibility of either of the two opposing economic 
predictions motivates us to empirically examine the effect of CGR intervention in an 
emerging market set-up where weaker market forces of corporate scrutiny make mandatory 
CGR an important policy tool to improve corporate governance practices. 
Employing a major CGR in India, our main result, supported by a series of robustness 
checks, provides strong evidence in support of the argument that stricter CGR intervention 
increases corporate risk-taking. We argue that, contrary to recent evidence around SOX, 
stricter CGR in a set-up facing a weaker investor protection regime and the prevalence of 
dominant insiders could reduce the private benefits of dominant insiders, thereby expanding a 
firm’s appetite for risk-taking. 
Our results, which are driven by increased risk-taking among firms with higher 
ownership concentration, suggest that CGR increases the risk-taking of otherwise investment 
conservative firms. Our results also indicate that risk-taking is an important channel through 
which CGR harnesses higher valuation for firms. These findings imply that in a set-up with a 
weaker market mechanism of corporate governance, CGR substitutes weaker market forces 
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of corporate scrutiny to stimulate value-enhancing risk-taking and corporate investments. 
This evidence supports the view that stricter corporate governance interventions can bring 
about positive investment outcomes in the evolving regulatory environment of emerging 
markets. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the average of variables (along with their standard deviation presented in the second row and 
number of observations presented in the third row for each variable) used in the analysis for the entire study 
period and also segregated into two periods, i.e. before Clause-49 enforcement (2000-2003) and after Clause-49 
(2004-2007). Earnings-volatility is defined as a three-year rolling standard deviation of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets . Capital expenditure is the change in long-
term assets scaled by previous year total long-term assets. R&D expenditure is computed as a fraction of total 
assets. The measures of risk-taking and corporate investments are expressed in percentages. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets expressed in millions of Indian currency (INR). Leverage is the ratio of book value of 
debt to book value of equity. Liquidity is the book liquidity obtained by dividing liquid assets by current 
liabilities. OwnCon is the ownership concentration variable computed as shares owned by promoting 
shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding. MB represents the ratio of the market value of 
shareholders’ equity to its book value. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels respectively. The sample period ranges from year 2000 to 2007. Source: CMIE database. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Overall 
[1] 
Pre-Clause-49 
[2] 
Post-Clause-49 
[3] 
Difference 
[3-2] 
earnings-volatility 6.54 5.83  7.20  1.37*** 
 (5.78) (5.60) (5.92) 
 26336 12630 13706 
capital expenditure 12.80  11.46  14.03  2.57*** 
 (11.20) (10.21) (11.92) 
 26584 12763 13821 
R&D expenditure 1.47  1.25  1.68  0.43*** 
 (1.58) (1.43) (1.71) 
 5988  2974 3014 
Size 6.10  5.96  6.23  0.27*** 
 (1.86) (1.77) (1.95) 
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 26584 12763 13821 
Leverage 1.37  1.46  1.28  -0.18*** 
 (1.73) (1.91) (1.54) 
 19560 9762 9794 
Liquidity 2.83  2.81 2.84 0.03** 
 (5.52) (5.12) (5.90) 
 22858 11339 11519 
OwnCon 49.09  49.08  49.09  0.01 
 (19.98) (19.62) (22.07) 
 16372 6929 9443 
MB 1.41 1.02  1.77  0.75*** 
 (2.54) (2.05) (2.81) 
 25842 12257 13585 
 
Table 2 Firm Characteristics of Groups Exogenously Determined by Clause-49 before 2004 
Enforcement 
Table 2 reports the average values of variables used in this study along with their standard deviations (in 
parentheses) and firm-year observations respectively of firms classified into five different groups based on the 
applicability of Clause-49 and size. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. Groups 1 to 3 firms are subject 
to Clause-49, as explained in the text. Group 1 firms are large-cap companies listed as the flag "A" category on 
the Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd. (BSE). Group 2 firms are mid-cap companies that have paid-up capital greater 
than INR 100 million or net worth greater than or equal to INR 250 million. Group 3 firms are low-cap firms 
that have paid-up capital between INR 100 million and 30 million. We classify 3A firms with paid-up capital 
between 100 million and 45 million and 3B firms with paid-up capital between 45 million and 30 million. 
Groups 4 comprise control firms. Group 4A firms have paid-up capital between INR 15 million and 30 million. 
Group 4B firms have paid-up capital less than INR 15 million. The last column reports summary statistics for 
cross-listed firms. The sample period is from 2000 to 2003. Source CMIE. 
Variables 
Mean (SD), no. of observations 
Treated groups Control Groups 
Alt. Control 
Group 
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Group 1 Group 2 
Group 3 Group 4 Cross-listed 
Firms Group 3A Group 3B Group 4 A Group 4B 
earnings-volatility 3.13 5.34 6.06 6.82 6.84 6.82 3.55 
(2.79) (4.40) (5.32) (4.90) (4.90) (4.18) (3.49) 
605 4729 2868 2542 918 642 326 
capital expenditure 16.49 10.87 11.28 11.41 9.97 12.87 14.16 
(12.44) (10.57) (10.18) (10.23) (10.71) (9.37) (12.46) 
607 4779 2881 2602 924 624 328 
R&D expenditure 1.98 1.02 1.26 1.41 1.52 1.48 1.03 
(2.85) (1.74) (2.41) (2.35) (1.54) (1.42) (2.20) 
344 1102 483 302 286 261 208 
Size 8.84 7.01 5.07 4.85 4.85 3.90 8.86 
(1.52) (1.16) (0.85) (0.97) (0.98) (1.32) (1.44) 
607 4779 2881 2602 924 624 328 
Leverage 1.11 1.70 1.52 1.19 1.20 1.26 1.10 
(2.22) (3.08) (3.38) (2.43) (2.50) (2.76) (1.11) 
599 3856 2133 1795 464 589 326 
Liquidity 2.66 3.30 2.62 2.33 2.34 2.50 2.47 
(6.76) (9.37) (3.41) (1.94) (6.92) (3.65) (1.93) 
 
OwnCon 
605 4444 2189 2408 556 637 326 
56.37 51.63 43.34 46.98 48.87 54.90 38.72 
(18.33) (18.92) (17.85) (19.34) (19.89) (25.18) (16.81) 
569 2780 1222 1378 290 364 326 
MB 2.28 0.91 0.81 0.97 0.98 1.11 2.26 
(3.36) (1.80) (1.93) (2.70) (2.09) (1.61) (6.49) 
597 4617 2691 2511 907 608 326 
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Table 3 Regression Discontinuity Around Paid-up Equity Capital Threshold  
Table 3 reports the results of different specifications of the following regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽. 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1) + 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑖  ) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝜗𝑗 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
 With entire Sample Firms With Group 3 (treated) and Group 4 (control) 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
Clause-49 0.73** 2.27** 1.05*** 0.84** 2.64** 1.66*** 
 (2.34) (2.23) (2.94) (2.43) (2.52) (2.73) 
       
Size -0.88*** 1.31*** -0.50*** -1.61*** 2.60*** -0.89** 
 (-12.87) (4.35) (-2.86) (-7.85) (11.48) (-2.51) 
       
Leverage -0.03 0.78*** -0.12*** -0.23*** 1.53*** -0.01 
 (-0.71) (4.26) (-6.58) (2.91) (4.01) (-0.06) 
       
Liquidity -0.02 -0.03 -0.07* -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 
 (-1.28) (-0.57) (-1.77) (-0.29) (-1.17) (-1.54) 
       
OwnCon -0.02*** -0.05* -0.02*** -0.02* -0.17*** -0.03*** 
 (-3.48) (-1.79) (-2.88) (-1.78) (-3.92) (-3.39) 
       
MB 0.43*** 2.02*** 0.37*** 0.54*** 3.20*** 1.55*** 
 (7.87) (6.81) (3.64) (4.78) (5.52) (3.03) 
       
Constant 10.09*** 5.74** 4.89*** 8.83*** 4.30** 6.97*** 
 (7.60) (2.24) (3.79) (3.17) (2.16) (2.86) 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3359 3353 1083 1416 1401 228 
Adj. R2 0.27 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.27 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the 
notes to Table 1. 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms with paid-up equity 
capital of INR 30 million or more and zero otherwise. 𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm-level control variables. Firm level 
controls include size, leverage liquidity, ownership concentration (OwnCon) and market -to-book (MB). 𝜗𝑗 
controls for industry fixed effects. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in 
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parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
The sample period ranges from year 2004 to 2005. Source: CMIE database. 
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Table 4 Propensity Score Matched-DiD Regression Around Paid-up Equity Capital Threshold 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the 
notes to Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 171 matched treated firms 
and zero for 171 matched control firms from Groups 3 and 4 of Table 4 respectively based on pre -CGR PSM. 
1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for years including and after 2004 and zero 
otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕  is a vector of firm level controls that includes size, leverage, liquidity, ownership concentration 
(OwnCon) and market-to-book (MB). 𝛾𝑖  and 𝜏𝑡  control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is 
the error term. Models [1] and [2] report regression without and with controls. Variables are winsorized at 1% 
and 99% for regression in Panel B. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following 
Petersen (2009). Panel C presents univariate DiD estimates of the matched treated and control groups. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. The sample period 
ranges from year 2000 to 2007. Source: CMIE database. 
Panel A: Pre-match Propensity Score Regression and Post-match Diagnostic Regression 
 Dummy = 1 if in Group 3 of Treated Firms;  
0 if in Control Firms. 
 Pre-match Post-match 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] 
Size 0.30** 0.09 
 (2.07) (1.29) 
   
Table 4 reports the results of DiD regression of a subsample of treated and control firms based on Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) prior to CGR enforcement. Panel A presents parameter estimates from the probit model 
used to estimate propensity scores for firms in the treated and control groups pre-CGR. The dependent variable 
is one if the firm belongs to Group 3 (treated group) and zero if it belongs to Group 4 (control group) separated 
by the cut-off of equity capital of INR 30 million, as reported in Table 2. Model 1 of Panel A reports parameter 
estimates with the entire sample of Groups 3 and 4, whereas Model 2 reports those for the propensity score 
matched subsample. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are 
included in both Models in Panel A. Panel B presents DiD regression for matched firms as given by equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) .1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
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Leverage 0.06** 0.01 
 (2.61) (0.34) 
   
Liquidity 0.02* 0.01 
 (1.96) (0.89) 
   
OwnCon -0.00** -0.00 
 (-2.27) (-0.72) 
   
MB 0.12** 0.10 
 (2.21) (1.30) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
   
Intercept 0.62*** 0.52** 
 (5.27) (2.12) 
Observations 3952 1368 
p-value of 𝜒2 0.00 0.48 
Pseudo R
2
 0.113 0.023 
Table 4 continued… 
Panel B: DiD Regression of treated and control firms based on pre-CGR PSM 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] 
DiD 1.13*** 1.23*** 14.59*** 9.52*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 
 (3.23) (3.82) (6.28) (3.10) (2.92) (3.37) 
       
Size  -0.12 
(-0.37) 
 2.20 
(1.45) 
 -0.22 
(-1.56) 
       
Leverage  0.06  1.33  0.10 
  (0.56)  (1.09)  (0.78) 
       
Liquidity  -0.00  -0.00  -0.16 
  (-0.05)  (-0.00)  (-1.42) 
       
OwnCon  -0.02  -0.01  -0.00 
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  (-1.17)  (-0.14)  (-0.39) 
       
MB  0.12*  4.83***  0.09* 
  (2.09)  (4.55)  (2.04) 
       
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R
2
 (within) 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09 
No. of Firms 342 342 342 342 190 190 
No. of Obs. 2736 2589 2736 2697 602 602 
  
Table 4 continued 
 
Panel C: Univariate DiD estimator of earnings-volatility, capital expenditure and R&D expenditure 
 Mean Treated Difference 
(After-Before) 
Mean Control Difference 
(After-Before) 
Mean DiD Estimator 
(Treated-Control) 
earnings-volatility 0.57 0.05 0.52*** 
 (4.04) (0.15) (3.21) 
    
capital expenditure 3.56 0.83 2.73*** 
 (3.47) (0.35) (3.02) 
    
R&D expenditure 1.99 -0.02 2.01*** 
 (3.29) (-0.08) (3.21) 
 
 
Table 5 The Effect of Introduction of CGR in 2000 on Corporate Risk-taking 
Table 5 reports the results from different specifications of the regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) .1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the 
notes to Table 1.  1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 −49 =1)  is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for treated firms and zero 
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otherwise. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  is a categorical variable that takes the value of one for three years following and including 
the year of introduction of Clause-49, i.e. year 2000 and zero for three years before 2000. 𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm 
level controls that includes size, leverage, liquidity and market-to-book (MB).  𝛾𝑖  and 𝜏𝑡  control for the fixed 
effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard 
errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following Petersen (2009). t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. Source: CMIE database 
 
earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
(Intro=2000) (Intro=2000) (Intro=2000) 
DiD 0.19 0.91 0.05 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) ] (1.08) (1.51) (1.57) 
    Size -0.31** 2.13*** -0.48*** 
 (-2.63) (3.12) (-4.81) 
    Leverage -0.13** 0.25** -0.01 
 (-2.27) (2.35) (-0.20) 
    Liquidity 0.01 -0.10** -0.03 
 (0.51) (-2.58) (-1.69) 
    MB 0.06 0.03 0.01* 
 (1.47) (1.78) (1.96) 
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.02 0.09 0.03 
No. of Firms 2966 2958 602 
No. of Obs. 8121 8116 2809 
 
Table 6Robustness Test: Propensity Score Matched DiD with Cross-listed Firms  
Table 6 reports the results of DiD regression of a subsample of treated and control firms based on propensity 
score matching (PSM) prior to CGR enforcement. Panel A presents parameter estimates from the probit model 
used to estimate propensity scores for larger sized treated firms and firms cross-listed in international exchanges 
as at or before 2004 (alternative control firms), as shown in Table 2. The dependent variable is one if the firm is 
cross-listed and zero if it belongs to the uppermost size decile of treated firms and is not cross -listed. Model 1 of 
Panel A reports parameter estimates with the entire sub-sample of uppermost size decile treated firms and cross-
listed firms without PSM, whereas Model 2 reports estimates with a propensity score matched 81-pair 
subsample. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are included 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
 
in both Models in Panel A. Panel B presents DiD regression for the matched firms as given by equation:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) .1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the 
notes to Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 81 matched treated firms 
using PSM and zero for the 81 firms cross-listed in international exchanges as  at or before 2004. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one for years including and after 2004 and zero otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕  is a 
vector of firm level controls that includes size, leverage, liquidity, ownership concentration (OwnCon) and 
market-to-book (MB). 𝛾𝑖  and 𝜏𝑡  control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the error term. 
Variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels 
following Petersen (2009). Panel C presents univariate DiD estimates of the matched treated and control groups. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Models [1] 
and [2] report regression without and with controls. The sample period ranges from year 2000 to 2007. Source: 
CMIE database 
Panel A: Pre-match Propensity Score Regression and Post-match Diagnostic Regression 
 
                           Dummy = 1 if cross-listed;  
                                            0 if in uppermost size decile treated firms and not cross-
listed. 
Pre-match Post-match 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] 
Size 0.28*** 0.15 
 (3.89) (0.81) 
   
Leverage 0.01 0.01 
 (0.55) (0.03) 
   
Liquidity -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.51) (-0.06) 
   
OwnCon -0.04*** -0.03 
 (-3.69) (-0.79) 
   
MB 0.03** 0.02 
 (2.19) (1.04) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Intercept -2.15*** -2.13*** 
 (-4.15) (-3.42) 
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Observations 1364 648 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2371 0.08 
p-value of 𝜒 2 0.00 0.41 
Table 6 Continued… 
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Table 6 Continued… 
Panel B: DiD Regression of Propensity Score Matched Treated and Control Group. 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] 
DiD 0.66*** 0.52*** 7.98*** 9.21*** 0.99*** 0.56*** 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) ] (4.41) (3.96) (4.68) (2.86) (2.97) (4.49) 
       
Size  0.23  -0.41  -0.21 
  (-1.09)  (-0.35)  (-1.56) 
       
Leverage  -0.00  0.04  -0.14 
  (-0.13)  (0.24)  (-1.22) 
       
Liquidity  -0.01  -0.05  -0.06 
  (-1.07)  (-0.36)  (-1.27) 
       
OwnCon  -0.02  -0.11  -0.01 
  (-1.26)  (-1.81)  (-1.87) 
       
MB  0.04***  1.33**  0.15*** 
  (3.36)  (4.43)  (3.26) 
       
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 (within) 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.09 
No. of Firms 162 162 162 162 104 104 
No. of Obs. 1296 1296 1296 1296 832 832 
 
Panel C. Univariate DiD for earnings-volatility, capital expenditure and R&D expenditure 
 Mean Treated Mean Control Difference Mean DiD Estimator 
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Difference 
(After-Before) 
(After-Before) (treated-Control) 
earnings-volatility 0.96*** -0.20 1.16*** 
 (3.88) (-0.76) (2.98) 
    
capital expenditure 10.29*** -1.63 11.92*** 
 (3.06) (-1.07) (2.76) 
    
R&D expenditure 0.51** 0.05 0.46** 
 (2.35) (0.29) (2.33) 
 
 
Table 7.Placebo Tests 
Table 7 reports the results from different specifications of the regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) .1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is risk-taking proxied by Earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the 
notes to Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 −49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for treated firms and zero 
otherwise. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for two years after and including a false -
shock year (FSY) and zero for two years before the FSY. We take years 2002 and 2006 as two different FSYs 
resulting in two false experiments and report in Models 1 and 2 for each proxy of risk-taking. 𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of 
firm level controls that includes size, leverage, liquidity, ownership concentration (Own Con) and market-to-
book (MB).  𝛾𝑖  and 𝜏𝑡  control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following 
Petersen (2009). t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Source: CMIE database. 
 
 
 
earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] 
(FSY=2002
)   
(FSY=2006
)   
(FSY=2002
)   
(FSY=2006
)   
(FSY=2002
)   
(FSY=2006
)   
DiD-Placebo -0.06 -0.39 0.93 2.31 0.02 0.15 
1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) . 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒 𝑟 =1) (-0.20) (-1.17) (0.02) (1.26) (1.46) (1.76) 
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Size -0.89** -0.29** 3.40*** 2.85*** -0.08** -0.59*** 
 (-2.55) (-2.63) (4.43) (5.14) (-2.41) (-6.88) 
       Leverage -0.03 -0.14*** 0.46** 0.52*** 0.00 -0.01 
 (-1.15) (-3.27) (2.32) (3.25) (0.09) (-0.33) 
       Liquidity 0.00 0.00 -0.08** -0.19** -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.54) (0.32) (-2.05) (-2.60) (-0.59) (-1.66) 
       OwnCon  -0.01  -0.04  -0.00 
  (-1.37)  (-0.97)  (-0.60) 
       MB 0.01 0.10*** 0.02 0.06* 0.07* 0.00* 
 (0.14) (3.47) (0.07) (1.91) (1.82) (1.87) 
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.04 
No. of Firms 2966 2966 2958 2958 638 639 
No. of Obs. 7416 7621 7470 7696 2136 2139 
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Table 8 Possible Channels of Increase in Risk-taking 
Table 8 reports the univariate results of different channels of increase in risk-taking. Dividend Yield is the ratio 
of dividend paid per share to market price per share of firm’s common stock. Amihud Illiquidity Ratio is the 
annual average of the ratio of absolute return to the daily trading volume. Days with Zero Return is number of 
trading days with zero return as a proportion of total trading days in a year. Foreign Equity Ownership is the 
ratio of number of shares held by foreign non-promoting investors to total non-promoting shareholders. 
Independent Board is computed as a ratio of the number of independent board members to total board members. 
All variables except Amihud Illiquidity Ratio are expressed in percentages. Treated firms include firms affected 
by CGR and Control firms include those unaffected by the reform. The before period is 2000-2003 and after 
period is 2004-2007. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. Source: CMIE database. Sample period: 2000-2007. 
 Firms 
Before 
[1] 
After 
[2] 
Mean Difference 
[2-1] 
DiD Estimator 
Dividend 
Yield 
Control  1.46 1.44 -0.02  
   (-0.15) -0.33*** 
Treated  1.66 1.31 -0.35*** (5.36) 
   (-7.48)  
      
Amihud 
Illiquidity 
Ratio 
Control  0.2798 0.1913 -0.088**  
   (-2.20) -0.097*** 
Treated  0.2441 0.0583 -0.186*** (-10.05) 
   (-20.31)  
      
Days with 
Zero Return 
 
Control  10.13 11.82 1.69***  
   (2.97) -7.86*** 
Treated  16.72 10.55 -6.17*** (7.89) 
   (-14.19)  
      
Foreign Equity 
Ownership 
 
Control  2.72 3.03 0.31  
   (0.64) 5.81*** 
Treated  3.42 9.54 6.12*** (9.54) 
   (20.04)  
      
Independent Control  39.59 41.76 2.17***  
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Board    (3.69) 5.54*** 
Treated  36.78 44.49 7.71*** (6.61) 
    (12.44)  
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Table 9 Ownership Concentration and the Role of CGR 
Table 9 reports the results of different specifications of the regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜔. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) . 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜒.1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1).𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1)
+ 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the 
notes to Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms affected by Clause-49 
and zero otherwise; 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1)  is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for years including and after 
2004 and zero otherwise. 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the two-year average of the percentage of promoters’ shareholding before 
the enforcement of Clause-49.  𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm level control variables. Firm level controls include size, 
leverage, liquidity and market-to-book (MB). 𝛾𝑖  and 𝜏𝑡  control for the fixed effects of firm and year 
respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the error term. 𝜔 captures the effect of CGR on risk-taking (investments) over the cross-
section of ownership concentration of the treated firms before enforcement. Variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following Petersen (2009). t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. Models [1] and [2] report regression without and with controls for sample firms with non-missing 
control variables for each risk-taking measure.  The sample period ranges from year 2000 to 2007.Source: 
CMIE database. 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 
1] 
[Model 
2] 
[Model 
1] 
[Model 2] 
DiDiD-OwnCon 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)]. 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] (4.41) (3.71) (3.94) (3.11) (4.09) (3.95) 
       
Interaction-Treated-OwnCon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1).𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] (0.61) (0.63) (0.62) (0.68) (0.69) (0.60) 
       
Size  -0.01**  0.60**  -0.40* 
  (-2.88)  (2.70)  (-1.90) 
       
Leverage  -0.00  0.20  -0.00 
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  (-0.35)  (0.70)  (-0.14) 
       
Liquidity  -0.00  -0.36*  -0.02 
  (-1.19)  (-2.03)  (-0.28) 
       
OwnCon  -0.01*  -0.17  -0.00 
  (-1.85)  (-1.13)  (-0.45) 
       
MB  0.00***  2.03***  0.01*** 
  (4.03)  (4.91)  (2.41) 
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 
No. of Firms 2966 2966 2958 2958 667 667 
No. of Obs. 14845 14845 14859 14859 3580 3580 
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Table 10 Value Implication of Risk-Taking 
Table 10 reports the results of different specifications of the following specification: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜑. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 49 =1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) . 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽. [1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1 .1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1] + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1)
+ 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡  is Tobin’s Q calculated as a ratio of market value of total assets to its book value. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49 =1) is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms affected by Clause-49 and zero otherwise; 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =1) is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one for years including and after 2004 and zero otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕  is a 
vector of firm level control variables, which include size, leverage, book liquidity and ownership-concentration 
(OwnCon).  Risk-taking is gauged by earnings-volatility. We further use two other proxies of investments 
including capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as independent variables of interest. Variables are as 
defined in the notes to Table1. 𝛾𝑖  and 𝜏𝑡  control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the 
error term. Variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year 
levels following Petersen (2009). t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Source: CMIE database. The sample period 
ranges from year 2000 to 2007. 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] [Model 4] [Model 5] [Model 6] [Model 7] [Model 8] [Model 9] 
Triple Interaction-earnings volatility 0.04*** 0.05***     0.05*** 0.03***  
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1. 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 − 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦] (9.47) (5.01)     (5.17) (3.00)  
          
Triple Interaction-capital expenditure   0.01*** 0.01***   0.01*** 0.01***  
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1. 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒]   (9.40) (4.94)   (5.16) (2.91)  
          
Triple Interaction-R&D expenditure     0.06*** 0.06***  0.06***  
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1. 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒]     (2.88) (3.28)  (7.02)  
          
DiD  0.50***  0.27*  0.59*** 0.51* 0.38* 0.89*** 
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1]  (2.86)  (2.03)  (2.85) (2.00) (2.05) (4.47) 
          
Size  0.51***  0.48***  0.54*** 0.51*** 0.73*** 0.54*** 
  (5.34)  (3.80)  (3.32) (4.98) (4.33) (4.92) 
          
Leverage  0.08**  0.08***  0.08* 0.08*** 0.07 0.09*** 
  (2.58)  (2.82)  (1.95) (2.62) (1.35) (3.34) 
          
Liquidity  -0.01***  -0.00**  -0.01 -0.00** -0.00 -0.01** 
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  (-3.50)  (-2.16)  (-0.33) (-2.28) (-0.14) (-2.40) 
          
OwnCon  0.01  0.01  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (1.75)  (1.65)  (0.48) (1.64) (1.30) (0.98) 
Firm and Year Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.04 
No. of Firms 3755 2966 3782 2958 838 667 2601 667 2700 
No. of Obs. 25144 14845 25842 14859 5067 3580 14564 3674 14930 
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Figure 1 
Timeline of enforcement of Clause-49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
21 Feb. 2000 
 
 
Clause-49 
appended to 
listing 
agreement. 
Only newly listed 
companies have 
to comply. 
 
31 Mar. 2001 
 
Group 1 
Large firms that 
are listed as 
Flag A in 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange Ltd. 
have to comply. 
 
31 Mar. 2002 
 
 
Group 2 
Mid-sized firms 
with net worth 
history ≥INR 250 
million or paid-up 
capital ≥INR100 
million at any point 
in time have to 
comply. 
 
31 Mar. 2003 
 
Group 3  
Small-sized 
firms with 
paid-up capital 
≥INR 30 
million have to 
comply. 
 
 
12 Oct. 2004 
 
 
Section 23E 
mandates severe 
financial and 
criminal penalties 
for non-
compliance with 
Clause-49 
provisions. 
 
Clause-49 
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Figure 2 
Time-series plot of earnings-volatility of Propensity Score matched Treated and Control firms 
 
Note: Here, we plot the annual average of the earnings-volatility of Propensity Matched Treated 
and Control firms over the study period of 2000-2007. Before-CGR period is 2000 to 2003 and 
After-CGR period is 2004 to 2007. We calculate earnings-volatility as a three-year rolling standard 
deviation of operating earnings where operating earnings is EBITDA scaled by total assets 
expressed as a percentage. Source: CMIE database. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Stylized Mandated Provisions of Clause -49 
(Transcribed from http://indianboards.com/files/clause_49.pdf) 
1. Requirement of independent directors:  
 Fifty percent of board of directors are required to be independent in the case where the Chairman is 
the executive director and one third (33%) if the Chairman is a non-executive. 
 Definition of Independent Directors: Independent directors are defined as those not having any 
material pecuniary relationship with the company, not related to Board members or one level 
below Board, and no prior relationship with the Company for the last three years. Nominee 
Directors of Financial Institutions are considered to be independent. 
2. Board requirements and limitations: 
 Board required to meet four times a year (with a maximum of three months between meetings).  
 Limit on the number of committees a director can be on is 10, but only 5 for which a director can 
be the Chair of the committee. 
 Code of conduct is required. 
3. Composition of audit committee: 
 The committee should have at least three directors of which two-thirds are required to be 
independent.  
 All the members of the audit committee should be financially literate. 
 At least one member of the audit committee should have accounting or financial management 
experience. 
4. Role and power of audit committee: 
 The committee should conduct a minimum of four meetings in an accounting year with a gap 
between two meetings not exceeding four months. 
 The major role of the committee is to review statutory and internal audits, obtain outside legal or 
other professional advice, and review whistle-blower programmes, if any. 
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5. Disclosures: 
The clause requires firms to disclose the following: 
 Related party transactions, 
 Accounting treatments and departures, 
 Risk management, 
 Annual report, including discussion of internal controls adequacy, significant trends, risks, 
and opportunities, 
 Proceeds from offerings, 
 Compensation for directors (including non-executives), and obtain shareholders’ approval, 
 Details of compliance history for the last three years, and corporate governance reports (and 
disclose adoption, if any, of mandatory and non-mandatory requirements) and  
 Corporate governance reports. 
 
6. Certifications by CEO and CFO: 
 Financial statements,  
 Effectiveness of internal controls, and 
 Inform audit committee of any significant changes in the above. 
 
7. Certifications by auditor or company secretary: 
 Compliance with corporate governance. 
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Appendix 2 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variable: Risk-
taking 
  
earnings-volatility 
Three year rolling standard deviation of 
operating earnings where operating 
earnings is EBITDA scaled by total assets 
expressed as a percentage. 
Derived from 
CMIE 
Dependent variable: 
Corporate Investment  
  
capital expenditure 
Increase in Long-term Assets as a 
percentage of previous year’s total long-
term assets expressed as a percentage. 
Derived from 
CMIE 
R&D expenditure 
 
R&D expenditure as a percentage of total 
assets. 
Derived from 
CMIE 
Control variables 
Size Ln (book value of total assets). 
Derived from 
CMIE 
Leverage Book debt to equity ratio. CMIE 
Liquidity 
Book value of Liquid Assets/Current 
Liability. 
CMIE 
Ownership concentration 
Shares owned by promoters (insiders) as 
percentage of total shares outstanding. 
CMIE 
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MB Market-to-book value of equity. CMIE 
Industry 22 industries as classified in Appendix 3. 
Derived from 
CMIE 
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Appendix 3 
Industries classification 
In this Table, we provide an industry breakdown of our sample. 
Industry Code Industries No. of firms Observations 
1 Agricultural Products 153 1024 
2 Automobiles and Transport 163 1247 
3 Cement and Abrasives 48 361 
4 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 446 2905 
5 Computers, Software and ITs 238 1780 
6 Construction 196 1370 
7 Consumer Electronics 63 474 
8 Diversified 76 570 
9 Engines and Equipment 208 1623 
10 Iron, Steel and Metals 246 1832 
11 Leather and Rubber Products 34 253 
12 Media and Entertainment 66 418 
13 Minerals Products 21 155 
14 Miscellaneous Items 37 182 
15 Other Retail and Specialties 126 984 
16 Paper and Wood Products  71 457 
17 Plastics and Polymers 154 1186 
18 Processed Food and Tobacco 76 591 
19 Services 491 2872 
20 Textiles 325 2040 
21 Trading 535 3757 
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22 Wires and Cables 66 503 
  Total 3839 26584 
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Corporate Governance Reform and Risk-Taking: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural 
Experiment in an Emerging Market 
 
Highlights 
 
 Stricter Corporate Governance Reform (CGR) in emerging market leads to greater 
corporate risk-taking. 
 
 Following CGR, firms with higher ownership concentration pursue more risk-taking 
relative to firms with lower ownership concentration. 
 
 Risk-taking is an important channel through which CGR enhances firm value. 
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